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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 15384 
LARRY KYLE STEPHENS and 
TROY JOHNSON, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft, Utah Code 
Annotated §76-6-501(1953) as amended, a second degree felony. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before the Court sitting without 
a jury on July 19, 1977, wherein the Defendants were found 
guilty. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the judgment of the lower court 
reversed or vacated and the case remanded with directions 
to enter a judgment of not guilty. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the 4th day of December, 1976, Grant Mathews, a mink 
rancher from Providence, Utah, found the hinges of his shed door 
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at his ranch removed and 75 frozen mink pelts missing from a 
storage freezer inside. (T.R. 25). These pelts were placed 
there in plastic bags with each bag containing 25 graded 
pelts together with approximately 700 pelts to be taken to 
Orem, Utah for final preparation for market. These pelts 
and bags were not marked except each contained Mathew's 
card. (T.R. 31 and 54) Mathews records showed the missing 
75 pelts were all male with the coloration graded as 67 
pastel and 8 demi-buff. (T.R. 61) Mathews further testifiec 
that the Defendants had worked for him for a short time and 
were terminated about 10 days before the loss was discovered. 
(T.R. 39). The officers could find no evidence at the scene 
to identify the person or persons involved (T.R. 76-77) 
On a tip, the deputies from the Cache County Sheriff's 
office went to Shamrock Coins, a pawnshop in Pocatello, the 
end of April, 1977 and talked with the owner, Dan Williamson. 
He told them that two boys came into his pawn shop to sell 
two plastic bags containing 75 mink pelts on the 9th day of 
December, 1976. (T.R. 81) He bought the pelts which he 
identified the color as mostly a light color platinum with 
three black ones. (T.R. 84). He sent the pelts to Wilkinson 
Pelting Service in Orem, Utah on December 20, 1976 (T.R. 
113) who graded the 75 pelts as 61 pastel, ll demi-buff and 
three other mutations. (See Exhibit 9). These were in turn 
delivered to and sold by the Seattle Fur Exchange with the 
pelt description and sex listed (See Exhibits 10 and 11). 
The pelts were not available at trial. \lilliamson and his 
-2-
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wife were shown pictures of the defendants with others but 
could not identify the defendants. (TR. 99). At trial 
however, the witness Dan Williamson did identify the defendant 
Troy Johnson but could not identify the defendant Kyle 
Stephens. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CHARGES 
AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, A GUILTY 
VERDICT ON CHARGES OF THEFT. 
It is well recognized law that the burden of proof in 
criminal cases is on the State to prove each and every 
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
defendant is entitled to any benefit of reasonable doubt. 
Potter v. u.s., 155 u.s. 438, 39 L Ed. 214, 15 s. Ct. 144 
(1894) State v. Taylor, 21 U. 2d 4.25, 446 P. 2d 954 (1968). 
In Utah, the standard for a reasonable doubt is specifically 
set forth in State v. Williamson, 22 Utah 248 62 Pac. 1022, 
(1900): 
"A reasonable doubt is not a mere imaginary, 
captious or possible doubt but be fair doubt based 
upon reason and common sense, and growing out of testimony 
in the case. It is such a doubt as will leave the juror's 
mind, after a careful examination of all the evidence, 
in such a condition that he cannot say that he has an 
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the 
defendant's guilt." p. 1024 
This uncertainty of mind is one arising from a defect of 
knowledge or evidence and is one, if honestly entertained, 
which is a reasonable doubt. Williamson, supra, at 1024. 
-3-
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In the instant case, the Court sitting as a jury, found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellants were guilty of the 
theft of 75 mink pelts. Appellants respectfully submit that 
there is insufficient evidence to prove their guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt as defined in Utah law. The pelts which 
were sold in Idaho were never identified beyond a reasonablE 
doubt, as those pelts taken from Grant Mathew's shed. 
In Utah, the State must identify stolen property as the 
goods which are charged to have been stolen. The rule is 
set forth in State v. Hall, 105 U. 151, 139 P. 2d 228 (1943) 
reversed on other groun~s in 105 U. 162, 145 P. 2d 494 
(1943), in which the defendant was charged with stealing 
spark plugs. 
Under the authorities, it is clear that the State 
must definately identify the goods found in the Defen-
dant's possess1on as the goods which were charged to 
have been stolen before the jury may draw an inference 
of guilt based upon the proof of possession by the 
defendant of such goods. Hall, supra, at p. 230 
(emphasis added). ----
In that case, there was no evidence that anyone saw the 
Defendant or anyone else take the spark plugs. The State 
therefore, as here, relied entirely on circumstantial eviden: 
to prove all elements of the crime. The facts adduced were 
that two shipments of plugs were missing within six weeks, 
that not all of the shipments were missing, that the defendt 
was allegedly selling spark plugs at a discount price, and 
that the defendant had access to the area of the theft. ThE 
State was unable to identity the plugs as those stolen 
during one theft particularly on the second date tne spark 
-4- -
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were missing. This court stated that "proof in the alternative 
that they were either the ones stolen on May 23rd or part of 
the shipment which was stolen some six weeks earlier, will not 
suffice." Hall, supra, at 231. As a matter of law, the State 
had failed to prove the plugs were taken on May 23rd and the 
case was remanded for a new trial. 
Similarly, the 75 mink pelts in the instant case were 
not sufficiently identified under the above rule of law. 
The Court near the end of the trial, in response to objection 
of defense counsel that as a question of whether the pelts 
described in Mathew's original records could fit the 
description in the Wilkinson and Sea~tle Fur Exchange's invoices 
was too speculative stated: 
"This is too speculative, the whole thing has been 
in the same category" (T.R. 211) 
The lower court itself then in rending his verdict stated that 
testimony concerning identification is purely speculative. 
The Court: In this case, first of all as to the identity 
of the stolen property, mink of course are not branded like 
cattle and have a distinct different brand mark on them, but 
certainly by the circumstantial evidence you have 75 mink missing 
and 75 mink turn up at a place where one of the defendants is 
identified as being present and selling the mink, and of the 
same general description. I understand there's been a lot of 
testimony here about descriptions and colorations and gradings 
of mink pelts and about what I've learned in not only this 
case but others as far as mink grading is concerned is that 
this generally fits in about the same category of expertise as 
far as agreement among themselves as appraisers and surveyors 
and weather prognosticator. (T.R. 215 and 216.) 
-5-
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Out of pages of testimony, the lower court could credit th, 
experts with only a minimal degree of consistency which in 
listening to the testimony is understandable. The Court 
described very clearly the lack of certainty with which the 
pelts were identified. Grant Mathews readily changed his 
initial identification of coloration from 67 pastel and 
8 demi-buff (T.R. 30) to be the same as the coloration 
established in Exhibit 9 by Wilkinson Pelting Service and in 
Exhibit 10 and 11 by Seattle Fur Exchange. Lynn Erickson, 
an expert witness without any self interest, agreed that 
some disagreement may be made in grading coloration and size 
but was clear that a luletia pelt graded by Seattle fur Exchr 
in Exhibit 10 and 11 and consistent with "other mutations" by 
Wilkinson in Exhibit 9 would not be mistaken for a demi-buff 
or pastel. (T.R. 186) Even if one accepts the inconsisten~ 
in coloration grades as being merely graders' opinion, there 
one pelt sold in Pocatello that is totally inconsistent with' 
color gradation of the pelts taken from Mathews. 
This evidence does not comprise definite identification. 
fact, the only evidence that the pelts missing from the 
Mathews shed were those sold to Williamson in Pocatello was t 
fact that they were the same number. 
In addition to the critical difference in color, other evi 
was contradictory to the State's case: 
11 the mink pelts taken from Mathews were in three 
-6-
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bags but the mink sold in Pocatello were in two bags (T.R. 
81) and still more could have been put in each bag (T.R. 
99). Grant Mathews testified that 30 of his male pelts in 
one of his bags is very crowded (T.R. 11). 
2) Grant Mathews indicated that the pelts would have 
to be kept frozen to preserve their quality. (T.R. 35) and 
affirmed by Lynn Erickson (T.R. 206) The pelts were sold 
fully seven days after the alleged theft in a cooled but not 
frozen condition to Dan Williamson without any spoilage. 
3) Grant Mathews reported the theft to the local co-op 
with a reward which would have been reported to Wilkinson 
(T.R. 33, 34 and 39), but Wilkinson did not report anything when 
75 pelts were received from a non co-op member, namely, a pawn-
shop, just over two weeks later. If Mathews identification is 
so clear from invoices why did Wilkinson not note the connection 
unless the coloration from Mathews' report and that observed by 
Wilkinson were clearly different. 
4) The mink pelts of Mathews are only a small number of 
over 25,000 pelts prepared in Cache Valley the same time (T.R. 
66) with saw dust and in bags available to any co-op member 
(T. R. 31). There is no evidence of where defendant's were working 
after termination with Grant Mathews or whether other mink pelts 
were missing or not missing in the area during the same time. 
5) The State could not prove Appellants' employment provided 
them with any special information regarding the mink storage. In 
-7-
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fact, Mr. Mathews testified that most of the mink pelts were, 
mulated a few days before the break-in and he had planned to 
the pelts to Orem the night in question but did not do so beca 
he was tired (T.R. 43-44). It lS submitted that Appellants m 
being current employees would not know the pelt count on the 
premises. In fact, they would only know where pelts were kept 
and that they were removed often. 
Further, in consideration of the above points and the 
entire record, where the alleged offense and the accuseds' 
alleged connection therewith "rest wholly upon circumstantial 
evidence which evidence, as a matter of law, is reasonably 
consistent with the innocence of the accused, then this 
Court must hold that there is not substantial evidence to 
support the guilt of the accused." 
414, 115 P. 2d 911, (1941). 
State v. Burch, 100 Utah 
The lower court could not base its decision on one 
shred of direct evidence. By admission, the Court had to 
rely on circumstantial evidence alone. (T.R. 216 217). 
Such evidence must be viewed with caution and 1t must ~ 
every reasonable hypothesis except the guilty of the defendar 
state v. Romero, 554 P. 2d 216 (Utah, 1976). The State d1d 
not overcome this burden ot proof. 
-8-
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In addition, the State presented evidence which is not 
substantial. Based on the testimony concerning Appellant 
Stephens' alleged declaration against his interest, the 
lower court erred in relying on said testimony to reach its 
verdict. On page 149 of the trial transcript, the Court 
sustained a motion of defense counsel to strike the testimony 
of arresting officer Stauffer with regard to Appellant 
Johnson's testimony. 
The Court: I don't know, unless there can be some 
relationship to that, you can't tell from the warrant 
what's being referred to, and the only testimony I 
got here is that it could be the warrant, it could 
be- if its the warrant, you can't relate it to any 
specific event, or certainly not the event they're 
charges with. I would, therefore, sustain the motion. 
(T.R. 149 1. 7-13) 
Appellants submit that for this same reasoning, the 
testimony of Officer Alan Nelson is not admissible. On 
cross examination by defense counsel, Nelson responded to 
questions concerning the arrest: 
A. Approached the subject on the sidewalk, told 
him that they had a warrant for his arrest charging 
him with four felony counts. 
Q. Okay. Now was Officer Williamson present all 
during this time? 
A. Yes, sir. Or yes, 1·\a'am. 
Q. Okey. 
A. And he said, "What for?" 
know what they're all for," 
-9-
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with a burglary and some thefts of some furs." 
.•. We placed him in the car, drove him to the station, 
and deputies served the warrant on him and booked him 
into the jail. 
Q. Okay. At the time that you were arresting him 
did he at any time request the warrant to be shown 
to him? 
A. No, Ma'am. (T.R. 178, 1. 5-24) 
Appellant Stephens at the time of arrest had no knowledge of 
the events with which he is charged. Officer Nelson admitted 
he had no written warrant of arrest and did not know one of 
the four charges included forgery (T.R. 177). The Officers hi 
notes but relied completely on memory which was not clear. 
(T.R. 164) In fact, it was not until Stephens arrived at 
the station to be booked that he was actually informed of 
the specific charges against him. This testimony is clearly 
not substantial evidence upon which a guilty verdict may be 
predicated, especially in light of the lack of direct eviden~ 
against Appellants. 
In a criminal prosecution, the State is required to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt and by substantial 
evidence that the accused are guilty of a crime, and where 
proof is made by circumstantial evidence, it must be so made 
as to exclude all uncertainty or doubt of Defendant's guilt. 
State v. Sullivan, 34 Idaho 68, 199, Pac. 647, 17 ALR 902 (lo 
The State here failed to produce evidence to sustain its burc 
of proof. 
-10-
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The police officers knew that they roust prove each 
element beyond a reasonable doubt but the evidence identifying 
the stolen goods is very weak and certainly not enough to con-
vince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Difficulty for 
the State in proving elements of its case should only require 
them to work harder and not serve as a license to waive basic 
constitution rights. 
was: 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION OF THE 
APPELLANTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ALLEGED 
THEFT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The only evidence against the Appellant, Larry Kyle Stephens, 
1) he was employed by Grant Mathews for a short time of 
approximately ten days before the break-in; 2) a handwriting 
expert testified but he endorsed the check given to the boys by 
Dan Williamson; 3) he may have been one of the boys in the pawn-
shop; and 4) admissions made at the time of his arrest. 
The employment did not terminate with any hard feelings 
(T.R. 39) and as set forth in Point I that employment gave him 
no special knowledge of when pelts would be there or shipped to 
Orem for fleshing. This factor should be given very little 
weight by the Court. 
Even assuming that a handwriting expert's testimony can be 
sufficient evidence alone, the State produced no evidence as to 
·.,'1\<_·n, whL'lC, or- under whilt circumstances the Appellilnt, Larry Kyle 
-11-
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Stephens, may have endorsed the check in guestion. The check. 
presented for payment in Utah without evidence of who presente: 
The identity of Appellant, Larry Kyle Stephens, by Dan 
Williamson was extremely weak (T.R. 81). This was after he ha 
been presented with a picture of Appellant Larry Kyle Stephens 
by Officer Crockett, which he could not identify (T.R. 165). 
is indeed strange that Williamson could not identify Appellant 
Stephens by picture in April but could remember and identify h 
in Court in July, three months later. Mr. Williamson's test~ 
can best be surrunarized by his own statement, "It's so hard to 
remember, it's been so long ago." (T.R. 86). Mrs. Williamson 
also present in the shop on December 9, 1976, could not ident: 
the Appellants from the pictures in late April or at Court (T. 
108) . 
The so-called admissions were excluded properly and ca~ 
be part of the record as set forth in Point I. Each Appellar,-
was initially charged with four felonies and Defendant Larry 
Stephens was arrested without a written warrant. Not even th· 
arresting officer knew the exact charges. The trial court 1-1h· 
faced with the objection by counsel to exclude testimony of i 
similar nature by Appellant Johnson properly held it not relE 
because the Appellant did not have enough information or defl 
enough statement for the admission to have any meaning. 
Admittedly the testimony identifying the Appellant Tr~ 
Johnson is slightly stronger because he Wds identi t 1ed by Da' 
Williamson and his handwritinr; identification would }->lace h1: 
the shop with the mink ?Clts, but bdsr·cl un the po1nls raisec 
regarding Dan hlilliar:-lson'.s _lack r 1 J 1l!ntlfJ('dtl('TI 1n l .... Irll \·. 
-U-
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pictures, this evidence is not sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt Appellant Troy Johnson's involvement in theft. 
CONCLUSION 
A case determined solely on circumstantial evidence must 
be approached with highest scrutiny as afforded by law. If there 
is a reasonable hypothesis resulting from the evidence which is 
consistent with Appellants' innocence, there naturally follows 
a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. 
The state has not proven the essential element of the 
crime with which Appellants are charged: (~) that Appellants 
exercised unauthorized control over the stolen property, and 
(2) that the property they allegedly had was, in fact, stolen 
from Grant Mathews. Based on all the testimony at trial, there 
exists a reasonable doubt as to Appellants' guilt. 
For the reasons stated above, Appellants' pray that the 
verdict of the lower court be reversed and the case be dismissed 
for lack of sufficient evidence, or that it be remanded with 
directions to enter a judgment of not guilty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HILLYARD, GUNNELL & LOW 
-13-
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